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Nov., 1952
ONE YEAR REVIEW OF COLORADO CASE LAW
The following is a summary of materials presented on Oc-
tober 10, 1952, at the 54th Annual Convention of the Colorado
Bar Association. Subjects have been grouped arbitrarily to best
suit the abilities of the attorneys who conducted the research.
This is the third annual survey of Colorado law to be made by the
Association and was prepared and presented under the direction
of Charles J. Beise of Denver. Only cases which have changed or
added to the law of this state have been considered by the re-
searchers who have given so generously of their time in the prep-
aration of this work. We hope that the material on the following
pages will prove of assistance to Colorado lawyers.
CIVIL REMEDIES AND CIVIL PROCEDURE
CONRAD L. BALL
In Neilson v. Bowles,' an instruction with which the court was
dealing, read:
Such verdict should be on the one out of the four
different theories and claims which a fair preponderance
of the evidence indicates as the true, or most probably true
one.
The Supreme Court held that it is the duty of the jury to determine
as best they can which theory is supported by a preponderance of
the evidence and not which is "probably true."
Kubat v. Kubat :2 The District Court in a divorce action had
stricken from the cross-complaint allegations attacking the validity
of the County Court's adoption decree. Thereafter, in a County
Court action directly attacking said adoption decree, the County
Court sustained a motion to strike similar allegations on the ground
that the matters alleged had been judicially determined in the
District Court action. Held: (1) All matters relating to the
validity of the adoption had been stricken in the District Court and
therefore were not determined nor adjudicated therein. (2) The
attempted defense of prior adjudication should be set up as a
separate defense under Rule 8 and not by motion.
Risbry v. Swan 3 involved a suit for specific performance of
an alleged contract to make a will and to impress a trust on the
assets of the estate. Parties defendant were the administrator, the
State of Colorado, the mother of deceased, and unknown persons.
All defendants defaulted except the administrator and the state.
On the administrator's objection plaintiff's testimony was stricken
under the provision of sec. 2, ch. 177 '35 Colo. Stat. Ann., com-
monly referred to as "dead man's statute." Held: An administra-
tor is not an adverse party within this statute where the action is to
determine who is entitled to the assets of the estate since plaintiff
'236 P. 2d 286, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (Sept. 24, 1951).
2238 P. 2d 897. 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (Nov. 26, 1951).
2 239 P. 2d 600, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (Dec. 24, 1951).
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was not a "claimant" against the estate; therefore, the statute
could not be invoked by the administrator, hence plaintiff was
qualified to testify. The court stated:
As a by-line and possible guide, we wish to add the
comment that this case presents a quite unusual and rather
unique situation, one which will doubtless infrequently
arise. Great care, therefore, should be had that it be'not
applied other than under an identical factual situation as
here presented.
In Moreno v. Commercial Security Bank,4 it was held that a
petition to intervene may be denied where the petitioner seeks to
change the issues. The only appeal open to the petitioner who was
denied the right to intervene is from the order denying interven-
tion. Such petitioner cannot appeal from the main judgment.
Also, concerning a motion to disqualify the judge, the Court held
that a ruling of the judge in a previous similar case which had been
affirmed on appeal is not evidence of prejudice sufficient for dis-
qualification in a later action.
Rand v. Anderson:- At a pre-trial conference the defendant
was required to furnish plaintiff with a list of expenditures. There-
after the defendant remembered other items not included in the
list. He attempted to prove such additional items, but was denied
this right by the trial court. Held: This ruling was prejudicial.
Rights of litigants are not to be denied by this kind of a rule of
civil procedure. Pre-trial conferences are designed to expedite liti-'
gation and not to exclude proper and admissable evidence.
In McMullen v. Denver,6 it was held that violation of a quiet
title decree is not civil contempt under Rule 107 (a) unless the
provisions violated are mandatory or prohibitive.
Hoff v. Armbruster,7 was an action to impress a trust on assets
of an estate located in Colorado. The administratrix was person-
ally served. The heirs were served by publication of summons.
Held: Under Rule 4 (g) (2) (h) service by publication could be
made on the non-resident heirs as this was strictly a proceeding
in rem.
In Murrow v. Whiteley," the jury had found defendants liable
in an automobile damage case but failed to follow instructions on
the amount of damages. The trial Court denied plaintiff a new
trial on the issue of damages alone. Held: Under Rule'59 C (a)
where there is no need of another trial on other issues, a new trial
should be granted on the question of damages only. The court
stated that the application of this rule as here presented was one
of first impression.
In Pioneer Mutual Compensation Company v. Cosby,9 a damage
'240 P. 2d 118, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (Jan. 14, 1952).
1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (Jan. 28, 1952).
'242 P. 2d 240, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (March 3, 1952).
7242 P. 2d 604, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (March 24, 1952).
' 244 P. 2d 657, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (April 21, 1952).
9244 P. 2d 1089, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (May 12, 1952).
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suit, the insured defendant brought his insurer into the case by a
third party complaint asking for judgment against the company
for any sum he should be obligated to pay the plaintiff. The de-
fendant recovered judgment against the company for the same
amount as plaintiff's judgment. The Company contended that
defendant had no right to make it a third party defendant be-
cause of a "no action" clause in the policy. Held: The purpose of
Rule 14 (a) is to settle as many conflicting interests as possible
in one proceeding. The "no action" clause is directly opposed to
this rule and courts should not permit litigants to circumvent rules
of court by contractural arrangements. The court also held, how-
ever, that the policy in this case was one of liability and not in-
demnity, and did not contain a true "no action" clause.
McCoy v. District Court:10 At a pre-trial conference in an
automobile damage case, the Court ordered the defendant to fur-
nish plaintiffs with copies of statements made by plaintiffs and
given to defendants after the accident and before suit was filed.
The defendants brought original proceeding for writ of prohibi-
tion. Held: Under Rule 34, plaintiff does not have an unqualified
right to examine a statement made by him and delivered to the
defendant prior to the suit; he must show good cause. Rule 16,
providing for pre-trial conference, does not confer authority on
the trial court to compel production of documents or force the
making of any admissions. The defendant had no adequate remedy
here by writ of error.
In Reserve Life Insurance Company v. District Court," it was
held that where a party is notified to appear for a deposition, he is
not entitled to subpoena nor to per diem allowance nor mileage
under Rule 5 (b) (1).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, ELECTIONS, BANKS
AND BANKING
JOHN R. CLAYTON
Eachus v. People:' Defendant was not a bonded butcher and
sold some beef. He was convicted in District Court and appealed on
constitutional grounds. Our Supreme Court upheld the bonded
butcher statute as being within the police power. Our Court further
quoted with approval the following from a United States Supreme
Court case:
We hold that the police power of a state embraces reg-
ulations designed to promote the public convenience or the
general prosperity, as well as regulations designed to
promote the public health, the public morals, or the public
safety.
This case is mentioned to show that the legilature is our first line
10246 P. 2d 619, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (June 23, 1952).
n 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. 470 (Aug. 18, 1952).
1238 P. 2d 885, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (Nov. 19, 1951).
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